The Regional Security Map: From Qandil to Northern Syria, How Türkiye Frames PKK/YPG, DAESH and FETÖ Threats

Why It Matters

Türkiye's regional security map explains why Ankara acts militarily beyond its borders and why it disagrees with some allies. It runs from the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq, across northern Syria, to a domestic front against FETÖ. Turkish officials describe these as distinct but overlapping threats that must be countered at the same time, and their framing shapes NATO politics, US–Türkiye relations, Syria's future and Europe's own security debates.

This pillar guide keeps facts, other actors' positions and Türkiye's official position apart. It is written for diplomats, analysts, journalists and general readers who want to trace each claim to its source. For the site's method, see About Region & Politics and the Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

Background

The southern border as a security geography

Türkiye shares a land border of roughly 1,300 km (about 810 miles) with Syria (around 900 km) and Iraq (around 370 km). Turkish policy documents treat this line as the front of a long-running counter-terrorism effort, summed up in the phrase Hudut namustur ('the border is honour'). Ankara also draws on the older principle of İnsanı yaşat ki devlet yaşasın ('let the people live so that the state lives').

Qandil and northern Iraq: the PKK

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) was founded in 1978 and began its armed campaign against the Turkish state on 15 August 1984. It is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. The group operates under an umbrella structure called the KCK, with its senior leadership historically based in the Qandil mountains on the Iraq–Iran border. Turkish authorities attribute tens of thousands of deaths, including many civilians, to the four-decade conflict.

Türkiye's response in northern Iraq has combined air strikes with the Operation Claw (Pençe) series, which began in 2019 and has included land operations such as Claw-Lock (2022). Their stated goal is to clear PKK camps, caves and tunnel networks near the border. Baghdad has protested some strikes as violations of Iraqi sovereignty. In March 2024, however, Iraq's National Security Council declared the PKK a banned organization.

Northern Syria: from PYD/YPG to the SDF

The PYD (Democratic Union Party) and its armed wing, the YPG (People's Protection Units), emerged in Syria after 2011. Ankara says they were created by, and remain organically tied to, the PKK/KCK. In 2015 the United States began partnering with the YPG against DAESH around Kobani. In October 2015 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were formed as a broader umbrella that Washington describes as multi-ethnic but in which the YPG remains the core. Türkiye calls the SDF a rebranding of the YPG.

Türkiye conducted four major operations in northern Syria:

• Operation Euphrates Shield (August 2016 – March 2017): Targeted DAESH along the border and sought to prevent the linking up of YPG-held cantons. It was the first major Turkish ground operation against DAESH in Syria.
• Operation Olive Branch (January – March 2018): Targeted the YPG-held Afrin area.
• Operation Peace Spring (October 2019): Targeted the area between Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain after a change in US force posture, with Ankara stating it aimed to create a safe zone for voluntary returns.
• Operation Spring Shield (February – March 2020): Conducted in Idlib against Syrian government forces after Turkish soldiers were killed. It is part of Türkiye's Syria campaign but was not aimed at the YPG.

DAESH and Türkiye

DAESH (the Arabic acronym for ISIS, used by Ankara and many governments) carried out major attacks inside Türkiye between 2015 and 2017. These include the Suruç bombing (July 2015), the Ankara station bombing (October 2015), the Istanbul airport attack (June 2016) and the Reina nightclub attack (1 January 2017).

FETÖ and 15 July 2016

On the night of 15 July 2016 a faction within the armed forces attempted a coup, bombing the Turkish Parliament and other sites. Turkish official figures cite 251 people killed, excluding the plotters. Ankara attributes the attempt to FETÖ (Fetullahist Terrorist Organization), the network of the US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, who denied involvement and died in October 2024. Türkiye has pursued the network through domestic prosecutions and through diplomatic requests to third countries.

Timeline

Date	Event
1978 / 1984	PKK founded; armed campaign begins 15 August 1984
October 1998	Türkiye–Syria Adana Agreement on PKK activity; Öcalan leaves Syria and is captured in 1999
2013–2015	Domestic 'resolution process' collapses in July 2015
2015	US partnership with YPG/SDF against DAESH begins
15 July 2016	Coup attempt attributed by Türkiye to FETÖ
Aug 2016 – Mar 2017	Operation Euphrates Shield
Jan – Mar 2018	Operation Olive Branch
Oct 2019	Operation Peace Spring
Feb – Mar 2020	Operation Spring Shield (Idlib)
28 June 2022	Trilateral Memorandum between Türkiye, Sweden and Finland (Madrid NATO Summit)
8 Dec 2024	Assad government falls
27 Feb – 12 May 2025	Öcalan calls for dissolution; PKK announces dissolution

Key Players & Positions

United States

The US lists the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization but has worked with the SDF as its ground partner against DAESH. Washington has generally treated the SDF as a separate entity from the PKK, although US officials have acknowledged links between the YPG and the PKK. It supports Türkiye's right to defend itself against PKK attacks while urging restraint to protect the anti-DAESH mission and civilians. This difference over the YPG has been one of the most persistent frictions inside NATO.

European Union and member states

The EU lists the PKK as a terrorist organization but does not list the YPG or SDF. European governments and the European Parliament have criticized Turkish operations in northern Syria on humanitarian and legal grounds. Several member states restricted arms exports to Türkiye after Operation Peace Spring in October 2019. Some European states hold prisoners of the YPG-linked camps, which is one reason they favour stability there. At the same time, Sweden and Finland signed the June 2022 Trilateral Memorandum with Türkiye, which includes commitments on PKK/YPG and FETÖ-related activities, as part of their NATO accession.

Syrian Kurdish actors: SDF and the Autonomous Administration

The SDF and the political administration it backs say they are Syrian actors, not an arm of the PKK. They say they lost thousands of fighters, a figure often given as about 11,000, in the campaign against DAESH, and that they hold thousands of DAESH detainees. They describe Turkish operations as threats to Kurdish and other local communities, and they accuse Turkish-backed factions of abuses in areas such as Afrin. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has documented violations by armed groups operating in Turkish-controlled areas. Ankara rejects the accusation that it is responsible for these abuses and says it has investigated allegations.

Damascus and Baghdad

Under the Assad government, Damascus condemned Turkish operations as violations of Syrian sovereignty. After the government fell in December 2024, the interim authorities in Damascus signed a framework agreement with the SDF leadership on 10 March 2025 for integrating the SDF into state institutions. Türkiye says it supports Syria's territorial integrity and a 'one state, one army' model. Implementation of the integration has been contested and fast-moving, so readers should check current reporting. Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government have both objected to civilian harm and sovereignty issues while cooperating with Ankara on the PKK question in varying degrees.

The PKK itself

Following a call from the jailed founder Abdullah Öcalan on 27 February 2025, the PKK announced on 12 May 2025 that it was dissolving and ending armed struggle. A symbolic weapons-destruction ceremony followed in July 2025. The Turkish Parliament later set up a commission to consider the legal framework for the process.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The points below summarize how Ankara states its own policy. They reflect official Turkish positions, not independent verification.

• Self-defense and 'terrorism at the source'. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency say Türkiye's cross-border operations rest on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of self-defense against armed attack. Türkiye has notified the UN Security Council of its operations in letters invoking that article. Ankara also cites Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which obliges states to deny safe haven to terrorists, and the 1998 Adana Agreement with Syria. It says it respects Syria's and Iraq's territorial integrity and acts only against terrorist groups. See the Crossroads Review analysis of Article 51 and the PolitiLine guide.
• PYD/YPG/SDF as the PKK's Syrian branch. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and statements by President Erdoğan, the PYD/YPG shares the PKK/KCK's leadership, ideology, cadres and weapons. Ankara argues that the group's role against DAESH does not change its nature, and that Türkiye's allies should not partner with an organization linked to a group they themselves list as terrorist. Ankara also says the group oppresses local Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens.
• Fighting DAESH on the ground. Turkish officials, including the Presidency and the Ministry of National Defence, state that Türkiye is the only NATO member to have engaged DAESH in direct ground combat, in Operation Euphrates Shield. They cite more than 4,000 DAESH militants neutralized in northern Syria and 100,000 DAESH-linked individuals prevented from entering Türkiye. These are official Turkish figures and are not independently audited.
• FETÖ as a coup-plotting network. The Presidency and the Foreign Ministry say FETÖ organized the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, which the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) condemned in a unanimous resolution at the time. Ankara has urged allies to treat the network as a terrorist organization and to act on extradition and other requests. It says its judicial response is conducted under Turkish law.
• 'Terror-Free Türkiye' (Terörsüz Türkiye). The Presidency and the Directorate of Communications describe this initiative as combining security measures with legal, political and social steps, under the rule of law, to end four decades of violence permanently. Ankara has welcomed the PKK's May 2025 dissolution announcement and says it must be verified and sustained, including in Syria. The government's position is that the PKK's Syrian affiliates must also disarm and integrate under a single Syrian state.

Türkiye also points to its domestic defense capacity, which Turkish officials say reaches roughly 80% domestic content in several programs, as a factor enabling this strategy. The defense industry guide examines this claim. The Polity Review guide covers the doctrine from another angle.

Source Comparison

International and Turkish sources agree on many facts but diverge on labels and legal reasoning.

Issue	Common Western/international framing	Turkish official framing
PKK	Terrorist organization (US, EU, NATO listings)	Same, with emphasis on four decades of attacks
PYD/YPG/SDF	Partner against DAESH; officially distinct from PKK, though ties are acknowledged	Syrian branch of PKK/KCK; same command and cadres
Cross-border operations	Often described as incursions; legality debated; humanitarian concerns	Lawful self-defense under Article 51; precision and civilian protection stressed
DAESH fight	Coalition effort; US and European special forces on the ground; SDF as main ground partner	Türkiye as the only NATO member in direct ground combat (Euphrates Shield)
FETÖ	Gülen movement; no US or EU terrorist listing; concerns about due process after 2016	Terrorist network behind the coup attempt
Peace process	Cautious welcome; focus on rights, Kurdish politics and Syria's integration	Terror-Free Türkiye; focus on disarmament, rule of law and 'one state, one army'

On the legal side, scholars debate whether Article 51 permits force against non-state actors on another state's territory, especially when that state has not consented or is 'unwilling or unable' to act. The European Court of Human Rights in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye (Grand Chamber, September 2023) found violations of the Convention in a FETÖ-related case, specifically on the use of ByLock messaging-app evidence. Ankara has stressed that it has continued domestic reforms and that the judgment concerns procedural issues, not the nature of the organization. Readers should consult primary texts, including Turkish letters to the UN Security Council, UN Commission of Inquiry reports and court judgments.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• PKK/KCK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party and its umbrella Kurdistan Communities Union. Listed as terrorist by Türkiye, the US, NATO and the EU.
• PYD/YPG/SDF: The Syrian Kurdish party, its armed wing, and the broader Syrian Democratic Forces. Ankara says they are the PKK/KCK's Syrian branch; the US distinguishes them from the PKK.
• DAESH: Arabic acronym for the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL).
• FETÖ: Türkiye's official name for the Gülen network, held responsible for 15 July 2016.
• Article 51: The UN Charter provision recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, subject to reporting to the Security Council.
• Operation Claw (Pençe): Turkish air and land operations against PKK positions in northern Iraq.
• Terror-Free Türkiye: The government's initiative to end PKK violence permanently.

Related reading:

• How Many Syrian Refugees Does Türkiye Host, and How Do Voluntary Returns Work? and the Interstate Journal analysis on border security and the hosting burden
• Defense Industry and the Regional Balance of Power
• Reader FAQ: Sources, Method and Perspective
• Region & Politics home

Region & Politics presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective that defends the country's strategic and legal positions on the basis of treaty texts, archival records and international law. Primary sources, including official documents, UN texts, treaties and archival materials, are cited wherever possible so that readers can verify claims independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. — Region & Politics Editorial Team