Cyprus, an Island of Two Peoples: Territory, the 1959–1960 Treaties and the Case for Sovereign Equality

Why It Matters

Cyprus is a small island with an outsized role in Eastern Mediterranean politics, and its core question is simple: who holds sovereignty on an island shared by two peoples? The 1959–1960 treaties answered that the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were equal co-founders of a partnership state. The UN, the EU, Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration still seek a bizonal, bicommunal federation, while Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) argue that more than six decades of failed negotiations show federation is exhausted and that a settlement must begin with the sovereign equality of the two peoples.

This guide reads the issue from geography outward: the island, the two communities, the treaties built on them, and the positions of each side as they state them.

Background

The island and its two communities

Cyprus covers about 9,251 km² (3,572 sq mi), making it the third-largest island in the Mediterranean. It lies roughly 70–75 km (about 45 miles) from Türkiye's southern coast and well over 800 km (500 miles) from the Greek mainland. Ottoman rule began in 1571 and lasted until 1878, when the island passed to British administration. The British annexed it in 1914, and Türkiye recognised that status in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Cyprus became a Crown colony in 1925.

By the time of independence, Greek Cypriots made up roughly four-fifths of the population and Turkish Cypriots roughly one-fifth, as commonly cited from the 1960 census. The two communities had separate religious, educational and communal institutions, and in the 1950s they pursued opposing political goals. Greek Cypriot nationalists campaigned for ENOSIS (union with Greece). Turkish Cypriots, facing the armed campaign of the EOKA organisation, which Colonel Georgios Grivas founded in 1955, called for partition (taksim) rather than rule by a Greek-aligned majority. According to Turkish accounts, Turkish Cypriots had to leave 33 mixed villages between 1955 and 1958.

The 1959 Zurich and London Agreements

The Zurich and London Agreements of 11 February 1959, concluded by Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom with the leaders of the two communities, closed both enosis and partition off. They produced a set of interlocking instruments:

• The Constitution of 1960, which built a power-sharing state on community equality: a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, each elected by their own community, with the Vice-President holding a final veto over foreign affairs, defence and security. The constitution also set fixed ratios in the civil service (70:30) and the army (60:40), and created separate communal chambers and municipalities.
• The Treaty of Guarantee, under which Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus. Article I bars union with any other state and bars partition. Article IV provides that if the guarantors cannot act in concert after consultation, each reserves the right to take action 'with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.'
• The Treaty of Alliance, which stationed small Greek and Turkish contingents on the island.
• The Treaty of Establishment, which kept two British Sovereign Base Areas, Akrotiri and Dhekelia.

The Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed on 16 August 1960. Its legal design was a partnership of two communities, not a unitary state with a minority.

1963–1964: the breakdown

The partnership operated for barely three years. On 30 November 1963, President Archbishop Makarios sent the Vice-President thirteen proposed constitutional amendments. They would have removed the Vice-President's veto, ended separate majorities in the legislature and reduced the fixed community ratios. Makarios's side presented them as measures to make the state workable. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara rejected them on 16 December 1963 as dismantling the foundations of the partnership.

Fighting broke out on 21 December 1963, remembered by Turkish Cypriots as 'Bloody Christmas' (Kanlı Noel). Turkish sources say it was carried out under the so-called Akritas Plan, a Greek Cypriot planning document that anticipated the removal of constitutional safeguards, by force if necessary. Turkish accounts count about 30,000 Turkish Cypriots displaced from roughly 103 villages, and Turkish Cypriot officials leaving state organs. The Green Line, drawn across Nicosia on 30 December 1963, separated the communities. Greek Cypriot accounts say instead that Turkish Cypriots withdrew from state institutions on the instructions of their own leadership. The two accounts agree that by early 1964 the joint government no longer functioned.

UN Security Council Resolution 186 (4 March 1964) created the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). It also treated the Greek Cypriot-led administration as the 'Government of Cyprus.' Ankara argues that this created a lasting asymmetry of status between the two sides.

1974 and 1983

On 15 July 1974, the Greek military junta and the EOKA leader Nikos Sampson staged a coup in Nicosia against President Makarios. Türkiye consulted the United Kingdom under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee and, when no joint action followed, launched its operation on 20 July 1974. Türkiye describes it as the exercise of treaty rights to prevent enosis and protect the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek junta fell days later, and the island was left divided along the present ceasefire line, a UN buffer zone about 180 km (110 miles) long.

After later negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot administration declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975). On 15 November 1983, under Rauf Raif Denktaş, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed. UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) called that declaration legally invalid, and only Türkiye recognises the TRNC.

The settlement efforts

The 1977 Makarios–Denktaş and 1979 Kyprianou–Denktaş High-Level Agreements set the UN negotiating frame of a bicommunal, bizonal federation. The table summarises the main stages since.

Date	Event	Outcome
11 Feb 1959	Zurich and London Agreements	Partnership republic and guarantor system designed
16 Aug 1960	Republic of Cyprus proclaimed	Two communities as co-founders
30 Nov 1963	13 amendments proposed	Rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side on 16 Dec
21 Dec 1963	Intercommunal fighting	Joint government ends; Green Line on 30 Dec
4 Mar 1964	UNSC Resolution 186	UNFICYP created; 'Government of Cyprus' language
15–20 Jul 1974	Coup, then Article IV operation	De facto division
15 Nov 1983	TRNC proclaimed	UNSC Res. 541 calls it legally invalid
24 Apr 2004	Annan Plan referendums	64.91% yes (Turkish Cypriots); 75.83% no (Greek Cypriots)
1 May 2004	Republic of Cyprus joins the EU	EU law suspended in the north (Protocol 10)
Jun–Jul 2017	Crans-Montana Conference	Talks end without agreement
27–29 Apr 2021	Informal 5+UN meeting in Geneva	No agreement on resuming formal talks
15 Oct 2024	UN informal meeting in New York	Confidence-building steps discussed; no formal negotiation launched

The Annan Plan is the hinge of the modern story. The UN Secretary-General's plan was put to separate simultaneous referendums on 24 April 2004. Turkish Cypriots approved it with 64.91%, while Greek Cypriots rejected it with 75.83%. The Republic of Cyprus, represented only by the Greek Cypriot administration, then joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. The Turkish Cypriots, who had said yes, remained outside the EU's legal order, which Ankara regards as a lasting injustice.

The Crans-Montana Conference (June–July 2017), held under UN Secretary-General António Guterres with the three guarantor powers present, ended without agreement. Security and guarantees, troop levels and rotating presidency arrangements were among the unresolved questions. In Geneva in April 2021, the informal 5+UN meeting also failed to restart formal talks. At the informal meeting in New York on 15 October 2024, the UN Secretary-General met Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and discussed confidence-building measures, without launching negotiations on the substance.

For parallel treatments of the treaty framework, see the sister analyses by The Political Anatomy and Regional Order.

Key Players & Positions

Greek Cypriot administration (Republic of Cyprus)

The Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognised as the government of the whole island and led by President Nikos Christodoulides since 2023, supports a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality as set out in UN resolutions. It calls the 1974 operation an invasion and the north an occupied territory, and it points to roughly 160,000 displaced Greek Cypriots (a commonly cited figure) and the issue of missing persons. It rejects two states as contrary to UN Security Council resolutions and argues that the Treaty of Guarantee, as Article IV states, permitted action only to restore the constitutional order and not partition. It also opposes the continuing guarantor and troop system of the 1960 treaties, which it views as outdated for an EU member state.

Greece

Athens supports the UN-defined federal framework, wants the guarantee system replaced by new security arrangements and the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and works closely with Nicosia in the EU. Greece remains a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. It also contests Ankara's maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, which links the island to wider bilateral disputes.

The United Nations

The UN's long-standing frame appears in Security Council resolutions such as Resolution 1251 (1999). It describes a Cyprus settlement based on a state with a single sovereignty, single international personality and single citizenship, comprising two politically equal communities in a bicommunal, bizonal federation. UNFICYP continues to patrol the buffer zone, and the Secretary-General's good offices continue. Guterres has said that the sides should discuss steps that could rebuild trust.

The European Union

The EU supports a UN-led federal settlement. Cyprus's accession treaty suspended application of the EU's acquis in the area not controlled by the Republic's government (Protocol 10), pending a settlement. EU institutions and several member states have criticised Turkish activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Brussels's position is closely aligned with Nicosia's.

United Kingdom

London is a guarantor power and retains the Sovereign Base Areas. It supports a UN-brokered settlement and takes part in the 5+UN format. In 1974 it declined to join the Turkish request for joint action under Article IV.

Turkish Cypriot leadership (TRNC)

The Turkish Cypriot leadership has endorsed the two-state approach in recent years, presented as the recognition of the equal sovereignty already exercised on the island. It argues that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders of the 1960 Republic, cannot be reduced to a minority under a federal framework in which they have repeatedly said yes while the other side says no.

For how the island fits the wider maritime picture, see How Geography Shapes Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Claims.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The following reflects official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' published Cyprus positions, the Presidency of the Republic and President Erdoğan's addresses to the UN General Assembly.

• The 1960 Republic was a partnership of two equal peoples, and Greek Cypriot force ended it. The Turkish Foreign Ministry holds that the Zurich and London Agreements established the Republic on the political equality and co-founder status of both communities, and that the 1963 amendment proposals, the 21 December 1963 attacks and the expulsion of Turkish Cypriots from state organs destroyed that order. Ankara argues that UNSC Resolution 186 then treated one side as 'the Government', institutionalising the imbalance that has hampered negotiations since.
• Türkiye's 1974 action rests on Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Ankara states that after the 15 July 1974 coup, aimed at enosis, it consulted the United Kingdom as treaty obligations require, and then acted on 20 July 1974 to prevent annexation of the island and protect the Turkish Cypriots. Türkiye regards the right of guarantee as still valid and will not accept a settlement without effective guarantees. Other parties dispute that the action was proportionate to Article IV's 'sole aim.'
• Federation has been exhausted by half a century of negotiation. Turkish officials point to the 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements, the Annan Plan (64.91% yes among Turkish Cypriots, 75.83% no among Greek Cypriots), Crans-Montana in 2017, Geneva in 2021 and the 15 October 2024 New York meeting. They argue that the Greek Cypriot side declines to share power and prosperity on an equal footing. They also say the EU admitted the Republic of Cyprus in 2004 although the Greek Cypriot side had rejected the plan, which removed its incentive to compromise.
• A lasting settlement must begin by recognising sovereign equality and equal international status. President Erdoğan has said in successive UN General Assembly addresses since 2021 that the realities on the island must be recognised and that a settlement can only be built on two states living side by side. Ankara says this follows the TRNC's proclamation of 15 November 1983 on the basis of self-determination and political equality, and that it does not exclude cooperation, security arrangements or Turkish Cypriot–Greek Cypriot partnership between the two states.
• The island's status is tied to Eastern Mediterranean maritime law. Ankara argues that Turkish Cypriots, as co-owners of the island, have equal rights over offshore hydrocarbons. It cites the Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement of 21 September 2011 and the TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 proposals for joint committees and revenue sharing, and it calls for an inclusive regional conference proposed by President Erdoğan in 2020. See The East Mediterranean Gas Forum: Why Are Türkiye and the TRNC Outside It and the sister analysis on the Seville Map.

The legal argument rests on three pillars: the 1959–1960 treaty texts, the collapse of the constitutional order in 1963, and the principle that a people which has agreed to share a state cannot be made a minority within it. Turkish officials add that the UN-defined framework has been unchanged for decades without a result, so that continuing it exactly as before is not a neutral choice. For the treaty-law angle, see Doctrine Review.

Source Comparison

The same events can be summarised very differently depending on the source. Readers can compare the framing and verify each claim against the treaty text or UN document.

Issue	Common Western/EU and Greek Cypriot framing	Turkish official framing	Primary documents to check
1963–64	Intercommunal violence; Turkish Cypriots withdrew from institutions	Greek Cypriot attack under the Akritas Plan; Turkish Cypriots forced out	1960 Constitution; 30 Nov 1963 proposals; UNSC Res. 186
1974	Illegal invasion and occupation	Lawful intervention under Art. IV after a coup for enosis	Treaty of Guarantee, Arts. I and IV; UNSC Res. 353
Status of north	TRNC legally invalid; area is EU territory under suspension	TRNC is the expression of the Turkish Cypriots' sovereign equality	UNSC Res. 541 (1983); Protocol 10 of 2003 Accession Treaty
2004 referendum	Greek Cypriot 'no' reflected concerns over security and implementation	A 'yes' from Turkish Cypriots was not rewarded, while the 'no' side joined the EU	Annan Plan text; referendum results
Solution	Bizonal, bicommunal federation	Two sovereign states cooperating on the island	UNSC Res. 1251 (1999); Turkish MFA statements; Erdoğan UNGA speeches

Much Western coverage uses 'Cyprus' to mean the internationally recognised Greek Cypriot-led government. It often describes the north as occupied territory and tends to leave out the 1960 partnership design and the Turkish Cypriots' position in 1963–64. Turkish sources, in turn, seldom dwell on Greek Cypriot displacement in 1974, and a fair reading should include both. Both narratives rely on the same primary documents, which is why we recommend reading them directly: the treaty texts, the UN resolutions, and the Annan Plan referendum results. For how we handle sources, see Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

The security dimension also colours the debate. Ankara links its guarantee rights to its wider security posture; see The Regional Security Map and the analysis of defence industry and the regional balance of power.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Bizonal, bicommunal federation (BBF): the UN-defined framework of two constituent states or zones under a federal government with a single sovereignty.
• Political equality: in the UN's usage, effective participation by both communities in federal decisions. In Ankara's usage, it also implies equal status of the two peoples as founding partners.
• Sovereign equality: the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot formulation that two peoples with equal rights should have equal international status.
• Treaty of Guarantee (1960): the treaty giving Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom rights and duties to safeguard the Republic's independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order.
• Akritas Plan: a Greek Cypriot planning document, which Turkish sources say prepared the 1963 violence and the abolition of the constitutional safeguards.
• UNFICYP: the UN peacekeeping force on the island since 1964.
• ENOSIS / EOKA: the goal of union with Greece and the armed organisation that pursued it, founded in 1955.
• Green Line / buffer zone: the UN-patrolled ceasefire line dividing the island.

Related guides:

• How Geography Shapes Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Claims
• Fact Check: 'Islands Give Full Maritime Zones, So Türkiye Has No Claim Beyond Antalya Bay'
• The East Mediterranean Gas Forum
• About Region & Politics
• Region & Politics home

Sister publications also offer a view of the island's legal framework: Regional Balance.

Perspective Note

Region & Politics presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective that defends the country's strategic and legal positions on the basis of treaty texts, archival records and international law. Primary sources, including official documents, UN texts, treaties and archival materials, are cited wherever possible so that readers can verify claims independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. — Region & Politics Editorial Team